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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND HEALTH
CARE
George P. Smith, If

I.
TECHNOLOGY AND MORTALITY
Termed "technologically driven [and] death-denying,"' the American
health care system will persist at this level-testing and expanding the
frontiers of medical science-so long as individuals continue to insist in
their desire to attain a degree of immortality for as long a time as is
humanly possible. 2 At the end-stage of life, marginal improvements will,
assuredly, continue to be charted even though they may have been seenby the patient-as worthless from a qualitative standard of reference;
and, from a societal point of view, extraordinarily expensive.' Yet, until
medical science accepts the inevitableness of mortality, the medical4
technology costs associated with prolonging life will never be contained.
Thus, the challenge of contemporary health care distribution is to
structure a framework for normative decision making whereby the goal of
distributive justice' is achieved equitably for as many citizens as possible.
*
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ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN

211 (1993).
2. Id. at 214.
3. Id. See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF
MEDICAL PROGRESS (1990).
4. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 216.
5. "When applied to basic health care, the theory [of distributive justice]
provides that everyone - the poor, the rich, the young and the old have an
unqualified right to health care." GEORGE P. SMITH, II, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
BIOETHICS

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:421

The Modern Focus

A lead article in the January 15, 2002, issue of The Wall Street Journal
frames the issue and presents the dilemma of distributive justice in
contemporary health care administration. The title of the article is,
"Some Doctors Say They May Stop Seeing Medicare Patients After
Cuts." The article, itself, investigates the anticipated consequences of the
federal government's
o6 recent decision to cut Medicare reimbursements to
physicians by 5.4% .

This decision affects greater than an estimated

ninety percent of physicians currently treating Medicare patients.
In response to heavy medical treatment demands for health care of an
aging population, combined with costly new advances in medical
technology, a congressional formula approved in 1997 was designed to
control costs, reducing Medicare reimbursement amounts to physicians."
The formula's effectiveness is diminished because of the current economic
slowdown. 9 This factor, along with increased Medicare reimbursements,
has caused the federal government to cut reimbursement fees to
physicians by 5.4%."1

A member of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical
Association acknowledged that, "[p]hysicians are getting to a point where
they cannot afford to accept new Medicare patients."" Evaluated by any
standard of distributive justice, this move by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services-the federal agency that administers the Medicare
program-will be catastrophic for the elderly."
Conflicts in Distribution

Because of rising health care costs during the past fifteen years, societal
concern has focused on whether the world's health care resources are
BIOMEDICINE 176 (2000).

6. Barbara Martinez, Some Doctors Say They May Stop Seeing Medicare
Patients After Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at B1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The total cost of all Medicare reimbursements was $244 billion, an
increase of fifty-one percent since 1993. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. See also Washington in Brief, Medicare Rates Won't Meet Costs,
HMOs Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at A4.
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being distributed fairly and wisely. More and more, contemporary
medicine demands of its practitioners-particularly those in Americathat the principle of justice be made a distinct factor in the decision
making process. 3 Increasing governmental pressures continue to stress:
(1) the need to follow cost control policies, (2) eliminate waste and
inefficiency and, as noted, (3) implement the principle of distributive
justice in patient care. As a consequence of these three competing policy
concerns, more • and
more, patient interests become secondary to
14
healthcare delivery. The central conflict for physician-gatekeepers, thus,
is to assure and maintain a patient-centered ethic in their professional
work while, at the same time, from a macro economic standard, safeguard
their responsibility to preserve society's resources. 5 Ancillary to this
conflict is the harsh reality that implementing distributive justice at the
patient bedside, without any real societal consensus on how it is defined
and practiced most often means that an arbitrary process is put in place.
This process depends upon-to a very large extent-the individual value
system of the person assigning worth to the medical intervention or
procedure put in issue."

In considering applications of distributive justice, then, physicians are
required to evaluate this operative principle at two levels: the statistical
patient or the identifiable patient. 7 The more direct example of statistical
applications of distributive justice is seen within the process of
establishing guidelines for utilization review. Another example is found
in the work of capital budget committees. Although decisions made
under utilization and budget reviews affect, assuredly, real people, it is
considered more appropriate and-indeed-safer by physicians to not
only consider and evaluate their rationing decisions prospectively rather

13. William S. Andereck, Money, Medicine, and Morals, in THE HEALTH
CARE PROFESSIONAL AS FRIEND AND HEALER: BUILDING ON THE WORK OF

D. PELLEGRINO 233 at 235 (David C. Thomasma & Judith L. Kissell
eds., 2000).
14. Id. at 236. See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL
GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY (1987).
15. Andereck, supra note 13, at 236.
16. See also MARY R. ANDERLIK, THE ETHICS OF MANAGED CARE: A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 125 (2001) (Pfiysicians want power, resources, and
EDMUND

freedom, in part to preserve life.., and in part to advance medical knowledge

through research.)
17. Andereck, supra note 13, at 236.
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than be
forced to evaluate issues of this nature at the bedsides of their
• 18
patients. Alternatively, when the particular financial resources of each
patient are factored into their identifiable medical treatment profile, the
second and unstable level of distributive justice is seen in bold relief. 9
II.
GATEKEEPING ISSUES
As observed, physicians are-of necessity-the primary gatekeepers to
the health care distribution industry; for they are responsible for not only
limiting or, as the case may be facilitating, medical tests but for treatments
as well as consultations and-most importantly-initial admissions to the
health care institutions themselves.20
There are three traditional
gatekeeping roles for physicians: (1) the defacto role, which recognizes a
responsibility to practice medicine which is both beneficial and effective
for the patient; (2) negative gatekeeping which operates under a
prepayment system and, in turn, requires a physician to limit, within the
rules of the system, the use of health care services; (3) or positive
gatekeeping, where the physician encourages patient
use of the health
21
care system for either personal or corporate profit.
Allocating and Rationing Health Care

Regardless of which of these three roles are assumed by the
gatekeepers, primary issues of allocation and rationing are central to all of
them; for, health care involves a competition for limited resources and
therefore-at one level or an other-forces a cost-benefit approach,
which balances reasonable individual needs against the availability of
medical resources. 22 In the face of ever-mounting distribution costs, it is
18. Id.
19. Id. at 237.

20. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23 (1986).
21. Id. at 26-29. See also ANDERLICK, supra note 16, at 158-59. See generally
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and
Obligations in the Physician-PatientRelationship, 10 J.
POL'Y 47 (1994).

CONTEMP. HEALTH

L. &

22. See Daniel Callahan, What is a Reasonable Demand on Health Care
Resources? Designing a Basic Package of Benefits, 8 J.

CONTEMP. HEALTH

L. &
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the elderly, in specific, who become major players in the health care
drama for which they are cast in alternating roles as victims and as
villains?0 While the health care system helps to prolong their lives, it also
2'
allocates more and more dollars into geriatric spending. The ethical
issue implicit here involves the fair distribution of public resources among
the different age groups.25
Allocations

The allocation of health care resources "involves a societal
determination of what resources should be devoted to a particular
program., 26 Perhaps the best examples of age-based allocation schemes
are to be found in the experiences in other countries, where cost
27
containment initiatives result in indirect limits on care for the elderly.
Utilizing cost containment initiatives or following a cost-benefit approach
to distributing health care resources is, however, neither practical nor
sound ethically, because either policy seeks to reduce or convert all health
benefits to dollar amounts. In turn, both seek, awkwardly, to convert
what might be considered quality of life benefits into hard,
uncompromising economic terms.8
One method proposed as a solution to this inequality of the cost-benefit
analysis seeks to evaluate the quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)
produced for each available health care dollar. 29 The goal of this resource
allocation strategy is to maximize the most QALYs for each available
health care dollar. ° There is a central weakness to this method, however,
because considering the limited remaining life years of the elderlyindividually and as a group-and calculating their QALYs is highly
problematic. Thus, for example, a group of elderly individuals needing a
POL'Y 1

(1992).

23. See HARRY R. MOODY,

ETHICS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 4 (1992).

24. Id.

25. See id. at 5.
26. George P. Smith, II, Our Hearts Were Once Young and Gay: Health Care
Rationing and the Elderly, 8 FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 9 (1996).
27. MOODY, supra note 23, at 197.
28. John McKie, Helga Kuhse, Jeff Richardson & Peter Singer, Allocating
Healthcareby QALYs: The Relevance of Age, 5 CAMB. Q.HEALTHCARE ETHICS
534 (1996).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 535.
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surgical procedure will not fare as well using the QALY approach as a
younger group of patients-this being rather obvious inasmuch as the
older patients in the group have fewer remaining years to live."
Rationing
Health care rationing is the fair distribution of limited resources by
limiting the availability of various programs and services." A central
concern with rationing, or in other words the planned distribution of
limited resources, is devising a system that is fair and equitable.33 In the
current American health care system, the ability-to-pay is used as an
implicit rationing device; yet, a lack of consensus in values and norms
prevents the development of a specific method to achieve the ends of
rationing health care services.34 "Thus, the debate is no longer whether
health care should be rationed, but rather, how to ration it equitably."35
Health care decisions, in the control 1 6 of third-party payers, have
distorted the ability to make real choices. Cost containment issues in
geriatric health care have also changed the role of physicians, and forced
them, as seen, to become reluctant medical gatekeepers.37 Inherent in
health care decisions is the conflict between saving costs and obtaining
quality health care."' In essence, "rationing has come to represent
discrimination in access to health care services on the basis of socio-

31. Id. See also ANDERLIK, supra note 16 at 55.
32. See Smith, supra note 26, at 10-11 (relating rationing to health care
needs).
33. Dorothy C. Rasinski-Gregory & Miriam Piven Cotler, The Elderly and

Health Care Reform: Needs, Concerns, Responsibilitiesand Obligations, 22 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 65, 83 (1993).
34. See id. at 83-86 (noting the possibility of many different criteria such as
age, disease and entitlement).
35. Smith, supra note 26, at 17.
36. See MOODY, supra note 23, at 39.
37. See generally Pellegrino, supra note 20; see also Edmund D. Pellegrino,

The Commodification of Medical and Health Care: The Moral Consequences of a
Paradigm Shift from a Professional to a Market Ethic, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 243
(1999).

38. See Joanne Lynn, Ethical Issues: Equitable Distribution and Decision
Making, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 17
(1985); See also Edmund D. Pellegrino, Metaphors, Managed Care and Morality, 3
J. CRIT. CARE NUTRITION 40 (1995).
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economic status.,

39

Rationing must be viewed as more than limiting care, for it is a means
preserved. 4
of providing care where resources are managed and
Rationing is also access control, which is dependent on the medical good,
the patient's values, and the needs of society itself." Here, justice involves
a constant balancing 2 between the good of the individual and the needs
and goods of society.
Aged-based Concerns
The moral and social costs of age-based rationing are indisputably very
high, as "the elderly would receive less than their economic due as a
return on their prior investment to society. 3 Indeed, the harshest
criticism against rationing is seen in the misperception that health care
will be withheld or withdrawn based solely on economic decisions.4
Rationing health care to the elderly is based traditionally upon a costbenefit analysis that views the elderly as poor investments per health care
dollar, or as a use of scarce resources with limited returns. 45 The basic
argument advanced here is that other segments of the population have
more of a potential return on the investment of health care dollars than
the elderly.46 Rationing does not mean necessarily the withholding of all
medical care. Instead, expensive treatments should be abandoned when
the chances of positive, rehabilitative results are minimal. 47 Thus, the
primary negative implication for age-based rationing is the demeaning

39. Smith, supra note 26, at 11.
40. See David C. Thomasma, The Ethical Challenge of Providing Healthcare
for the Elderly, 4 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 144, 152 (1995).
41. See id. at 155 (noting that the physician and patient must negotiate the
good to be accomplished).
42. See id.
43. Rasincki-Gregory & Cotler, supra note 33, at 90.
44. Thomasma, supra note 40, at 149.
45. Andrew H. Smith & John Rother, Older Americans and The Rationing of
Health Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1847 (1992).
46. See id. at 1853.
47. See id. at 1850; see also George P. Smith, II, Triage: Endgame Realities, J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143, 149 (1986) (suggesting that love and
humaneness serve as guides to determine when treatment cease-this, tested
against the ability of the patient to engage in or sustain human relationships).
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notion of placing a monetary value on an elderly person's life. 48
Chronological age alone, as the determinative factor, fails as a practical
approach in making health care decisions because of the great divergence
between theory and practice. 9 Instead, other variables, such as quality of
life and health factors, are as equally important in determining treatment
for the elderly. ° The utilitarian view of health care advocates balancing
many different factors such as public and private benefits, predicted cost
savings, risks involved and necessary trade-offs." In contrast, others
argue a functional approach to rationing where the functional status of
the person takes precedence over any utilitarian balancing." No doubt,
the best gatekeeping ethic is to be found in the inherent physician-patient
relationship-a relationship based on mutual trust and access to health
care information which then allows treatment to be consistent with a
patient's preferences or recovery potential. 3
The major factor in
addressing health care rationing should not be age. Rather, the course of
a patient's treatment should be dependent solely upon his individual
medical condition14 and shaped always by the goal of humane, loving care
which reduces human suffering, enhances the common good, as well as
safeguards the dignity of the human spirit especially in end-game
situations.5
III.

STRUCTURING A DECISIONAL FRAMEWORK
Establishing fair procedures for the distribution of health care
resources is a crucial goal for contemporary society to set and, hopefully,
to achieve. Accordingly, fairness is to be defined and shaped by four
conditions: (1) public accessibility to "limit-setting decisions" and their

48. See Smith, supra note 26, at 14.
49. See MOODY, supra note 23, at 190.
50. See id. at 189.
51. See Tom L. Beachamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, 47-55 (4th ed. 1994).
52. See Thomasma, supra note 40, at 157.
53. See Rasinski-Gregory & Cotler, supra note 33, at 91.
54. See Smith & Rother, supra note 45, at 1856-57.
55. See George P. Smith, II, Stop in the Name of Love! 19 ANGLO-AMERICAN
L. REV. 55 (1990).
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policies and rationales; (2) clarity in policy rationales which explain how
"value for money" is met in distributing health care resources within a
society where there are reasonable resource constraints on the resources
themselves; (3) a framework for principled decision making which
provides a means for resolution of disputes; and (4) a regulatory process
which not only assures public access to the initial "limit-setting decisions"
but also provides an equitable mechanism for challenging the
reasonableness of contested health care distribution decisions.56
Restoring Trust
Sadly, as a direct consequence of the multiple and conflicting roles a
physician is cast in or forced to choose between, because of either the
particular managed care program he is practicing under or the
professional ethic he espouses, medicine is no longer being seen as caring
for people. Rather, the politics of economic self-interest compromise-if
not extinguish-the sacred trust patients once placed in their physicians.
Stated otherwise, the system promotes the use of expensive, invasive and
at-risk treatments and places little effort in patient care.57 It has been
suggested that a new ethic needs to be recognized and embraced by
medicine if it might assist to one
physicians-one that shifts from using
8
will.
it
when
only
use
that promotes
BalancingNeeds
The ineluctable conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that in
formulating health care policies for the elderly, the principle of
distributive justice demands decisions such as allocating and rationing
health care be made fairly within the political process. It demands,
further, that broad grants of discretion (which in turn often promote
managerial indecision) to administrative decisionmakers in the HMOs
who, themselves, have varying systems of values, and to bedside medical

56. ANDERLICK, supra note 16, at 134.

57. George Lundberg, Severed Trust: Why American Medicine Hasn't Been
Fixed (2001); see also George J. Annas, Some Choices: Law, Medicine and the
Market, ch. 4 (1998).
58. ANDERLICK, supra note 16, at 5. See Marian Gray Secundy & Rodger L.
Jackson, Engendering Trust in a Pluralistic Society, in THE HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONAL As FRIEND AND HEALER: BUILDING ON THE WORK OF EDMUND D.
PELLEGRINO 65 (David C. Thomasma & Judith Lee Kissell eds., 2000).
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gatekeepers as well, be limited. It is only by and through deliberate
debate within a democracy59 that assumptions about aging, the value of
life for the aged and intergenerational responsibilities of assisting them in
their care can be set, tested or-as the case may be-rejected.
No matter within what policy forum this debate occurs-local, state, or
national-a fundamental balancing test will, of necessity, be employed;
one that weighs, in an equitable and reasonable manner, individual needs
with larger societal standards of economic efficiency.6 By seeking to
integrate moral and ethical reasoning with quantitative or economic
"formulations of needs and resources,' the opportunities for a stronger
and more contemporary standard of distributive justice will be both
enhanced and stabilized.
The penultimate moral issue seen in this debate is not-rather
surprisingly-whether too much or too little treatment is offered; but
rather how to seek an optimum level of reasonable or appropriate
treatment based on the medical condition of each patient.6 2 Failing to
meet resolutely the inherent difficulty of allocative decisions here
foredooms the total decisionmaking process to a continued state of
lethargy where inaction becomes the tragic hallmark of the distribution of
health care for the elderly.

59. See George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of
Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 93, 102-03 (where the
author recognizes the inherent weakness of deliberative democracy-namely, the
lack of interest and sophistication by the citizenry to engage the issues).
60. ANDERLIK, supra note 16, at 130.
61. Smith, supra note 26, at 22.
62. Id. See generally George P. Smith, II, Monograph, THE ELDERLY AND
HEALTH CARE RATIONING

(2000).

